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Self-reported reasons for moral decisions  
Many investigations of moral decision-making employ hypothetical scenarios in which each 
participant has to choose between two options. One option is usually deemed “utilitarian” and 
the other either “non-utilitarian” or “deontological”. Very little has been done to establish the 
validity of such measures. It is unclear what they measure, let alone how well they do so. In 
this exploratory study, participants were asked about the reasons for their decisions in six 
hypothetical scenarios. Various concerns contributed to each decision. Action decisions 
occurred when utilitarian concerns dominated. Bystanding decisions resulted from different 
concerns or combinations of concerns dominating in different situations, with utilitarianism 
usually among participants’ concerns. None of the labels usually used for either decision 
therefore seems entirely appropriate. Five concerns were identified as necessary and 
sufficient to predict over 85% of participants’ decisions. This suggests great promise for 
future research, particularly in investigation of real-world moral decisions.  
  KEY WORDS: Decision-making; deontology; morality; hypothetical scenarios; 
utilitarianism 
  
1. Introduction 
A train is out of control and will kill five people unless diverted onto a side-track 
where it will instead kill a single person currently not in jeopardy. You are by a switch that 
you could use to divert the train. Do you use it? Why or why not? 
Another train is out of control and will kill five people unless a fat man is pushed off a 
bridge into the train’s path, resulting in the man’s death. You, a more modestly sized person 
whose body would not stop the train, could nevertheless push the man. Do you? What are 
your reasons? 
These are two examples (from Thomson, 1985) of countless thought experiments 
devised by philosophers to explore people’s “moral intuitions” and to compare them with 
moral principles such as those provided by utilitarianism or deontology.  
Utilitarianism proposes that the moral value of acts stems solely from their 
consequences. Acts are of positive moral value to the extent that they maximise “utility” 
(often equated to happiness, welfare, or goodness), no matter whose utility is maximised. 
That is, acts are good (valuable) to the extent that they impartially promote the greatest good 
(utility) for the greatest number (Driver, 2014).  
Deontological positions suggest that the moral value of acts stems solely from them 
being allowed, required, or prohibited by moral rules. Acts are good to the extent that they 
are in accordance with rather than in violation of moral rules (Alexander & Moore, 2015).  
The Switch and Bridge thought experiments illustrated above seem equivalent from a 
utilitarian perspective. In each case, the choice is to allow five people to die or to sacrifice 
another person without their permission so that the five may live. There seems to be no 
reasonable basis for weighing the welfare of the singleton more highly than that of any single 
person within the majority. Everyone involved is a stranger and appears to potentially be a 
victim of circumstance. In the absence of good reasons to discriminate between the people 
involved, determining the morally appropriate action seems to be merely a numbers game: 
five living and one dying is better than five dying and one living. Perhaps because of such 
thinking, most people think that they would – and that everyone should – use the switch. 
However, most people think that they would not – and that no one should – push the fat man. 
Thomson (1985) referred to such apparent inconsistency as “The trolley problem”. “The 
‘problem’ is to explain why people respond (or ought to respond) differently to these two 
dilemmas” which seem equivalent from a purely utilitarian perspective (Greene, 2009, p. 
581). 
A great deal of research has sought to solve the trolley problem. The dependent 
variable in much of this research is participants’ decisions in sets of hypothetical dilemmas 
similar to Bridge and Switch. If these dilemmas are set up in the same way as described 
above, decisions to act are called “utilitarian” and decisions to be a bystander are called either 
“non-utilitarian” or “deontological”. This is because these seem to be the decisions that 
would be made by someone who was basing their decisions on the respective moral 
principles.  
This does not mean that participants are actually thinking about or trying to act in 
accordance with such principles. It means that – whatever participants are in fact thinking 
about and trying to do – their final decisions are the same as they would be if the participants 
were deliberately pursuing utilitarian or deontological principles. Thus, and slightly ironically 
given that hypothetical dilemmas were designed to give insight into people’s specifically 
moral intuitions, people being “utilitarian”, “non-utilitarian”, or “deontological” does not 
necessarily reveal anything about the moral content or form of people’s decision-making 
(Greene, 2014). It is even possible that utilitarian concerns could sometimes lead to 
“deontological” decisions and deontological concerns result in “utilitarian” choices.  
As participants in hypothetical dilemmas have to make decisions and can do so for 
any reason (which may or may not include commitments to utilitarianism or deontology), it is 
not very clear what is measured by “utilitarian” or “deontological” choices. Although recent 
studies have attended to ecological validity (e.g. comparing “utilitarian” and “deontological” 
decisions in hypothetical and virtual reality situations, Patil, Cogoni, Zangrando, Chittaro, & 
Silani, 2014) and to measurement issues (e.g. disaggregating “utilitarian” and “deontological” 
contributions to particular judgments, Gawronski, Conway, Armstrong, Friesdorf, & Hütter, 
2016), surprisingly little research has directly investigated the construct validity of 
“utilitarian” or “deontological” choices per se, i.e. sought to establish what such choices 
actually do indicate, reflect, or signify (but see Haviv & Leman, 2002; Tanner, Medin, & 
Iliev, 2008; Uhlmann, Zhu, & Tannenbaum, 2013). Such paucity of concern for construct 
validity makes it very difficult to interpret many of the accumulated findings within this 
domain (Bauman, McGraw, Bartels, & Warren, 2014; Christensen & Gomila, 2012; 
Christensen, Flexas, Calabrese, Gut, & Gomilla, 2014; FeldmanHall, Mobbs, Evans, Hiscox, 
Navrady, & Dalgleish, 2012; Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, & Savulescu, 2015; Kahane & 
Shackel, 2008; Rosas & Koenigs, 2014).   
The current paper investigates what participants report about the reasons for their 
decisions in scenarios such as Bridge and Switch. Although people are not always able or 
willing to accurately report their reasons for action (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) they often are 
(Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006) and participants’ accounts in this case would seem to 
provide at least prima facie evidence about their concerns and thereby go some way towards 
contributing “the important descriptive work that [ideally] precedes experimentation” in 
progressive science (Rozin, 2007, p. 758). 
In the research reported here, participants were therefore asked to what extent their 
decisions were motivated by a selection of concerns that have previously been claimed to be 
important influences in hypothetical dilemmas, i.e. anticipated consequences for the majority 
(Smart, 1973); anticipated consequences for the minority (Williams, 1973); anticipated 
consequences for the self (FeldmanHall et al, 2012); the nature of the action (Greene, 
Cushman, Stewart, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen., 2009); one’s feelings (Moretto, Walsh, 
& Haggard, 2010); relationships between oneself and others affected by one’s decisions 
(Bleske-Rechek, Nelson, Baker, Remiker, & Brandt, 2010); moral identity (Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013); wanting to do the right thing (Lombrozo, 2009); and not wanting to do the 
wrong thing (Gamez-Djokic & Molden, 2016). Importantly, rather than asking participants 
about the influence of only one of these concerns or asking them about the relative influence 
of pairs of such concerns, participants were given the opportunity to report the possibly 
simultaneous and shifting influence of numbers of these concerns.  
To capture the possibility that concerns differ in their influence across situations, and 
also to obtain some contextual information to allow us to better interpret participants’ 
accounts of their decision-making influences in Bridge and Switch, we asked participants 
about their decision-making in some additional scenarios (see Appendix 1 for all scenarios). 
Pond (Singer, 1972) and Appeal (Unger, 1996) structurally mirror the relationship of Switch 
and Bridge in that most people select utilitarian action in the former but not in the latter, 
despite action in each case involving relatively small sacrifices to ensure relatively large 
benefits for others. In these scenarios, then, utilitarian concerns are pitted against relatively 
small costs to self rather than (as is the case in Bridge and Switch) substantial costs to third 
parties. Fire and Torture were developed specifically for this study to introduce obvious and 
stark counter-utilitarian considerations. Thus, utilitarianism is pitted against love and loyalty 
in the former (Wolf, 1992) and against moral repugnance in the latter (Foot, 1985). 
The intuition guiding this selection of scenarios was that Switch and Pond potentially 
represent rather rare situations in which utilitarian concerns are salient and pre-eminent and 
clearly point to the appropriateness of action rather than inaction (FeldmanHall et al., 2012). 
In these situations, then, “utilitarian” responses would reflect the dominant operation of 
utilitarian thinking. In other morally-relevant situations, however, so-called “utilitarian” 
action might reflect the operation of various moral and non-moral considerations that may or 
may not include utilitarian and/or deontological concerns – as could so-called “non-
utilitarian” or “deontological” inaction (Aguiar, Brañas-Garza, & Miller, 2008; Aktas, 
Yilmaz, & Bahçekapili, 2017; Broeders, Van Den Bos, Müller, & Ham, 2011; Carnes, Lickel, 
& Janoff-Bulman, 2015; Chakroff, Dungan, & Young, 2013; Hughes, & Trafimow, 2014; 
Kortenkamp, & Moore, 2014; Tetlock, & Mitchell, 2010).  
2. Method 
Participants: Using a variety of methods (posters, advertisements on social media, 
snowball sampling), potential participants were given a web-link that randomly allocated 
each to one of the six questionnaires. One thousand one hundred thirty seven completed 
questionnaires were obtained. Using name and email information, 33 people were identified 
as having completed 2 - 4 questionnaires. All 76 questionnaires from these participants were 
removed from the data-set. Questionnaires from two further participants who were under 18 
years old were also removed. Of the 1059 remaining participants (sample sizes in each 
condition are shown in Table 2), 654 identified as female, 402 as male, and 3 as “other”. Half 
the participants (50.1%) were students; mostly (47.5%) university students. Two thirds of 
participants were in full-time (39.2%) or part-time (27.3%) employment. A third of 
participants (35.0%) were parents. Ages ranged from 18 to 81, with 20 being the mode (M = 
33.48, SD = 15.69). 
Materials: Questionnaires were completed online. Six were used, differing only in the 
specific scenario contained. Each started with a comprehensive information sheet which 
ended with a statement that informed consent would be assumed once participants clicked on 
a “next” button.  
Section 1 then started with participants being asked to read one of six scenarios 
(named Appeal, Bridge, Fire, Pond, Switch, and Torture) which were matched as closely as 
possible (see Appendix).  
Action decision. In each scenario, participants were asked how likely they thought it 
was that, if they were in the depicted situation, they would take the action that would most 
obviously maximise utility,  i.e. optimise the net welfare for all directly affected parties. In 
Bridge, for example, participants were asked to “try as hard as you can to imagine actually 
being in this situation. If you were, how likely is it that you would push the man?” (Not at all 
likely [1], Slightly likely [2], Quite likely [3], Likely [4], Very likely [5], Extremely likely 
[6]).  
In all but Appeal and Pond, acting would result in one person dying who otherwise 
would have lived and five people surviving who otherwise would have died, while not taking 
the action would result in five people dying who otherwise would have lived and one person 
surviving who otherwise would have died. In Bridge the action was to push a fat man in front 
of a train; in Switch it was to use a switch to divert a train from one track to another; in 
Torture it was to kidnap and torture to death a child; and in Fire it was to warn five people 
about an impending tragedy and in doing this give up any opportunity to save the life of the 
person the participant most loved in the world.  
In Appeal the action was to donate £100 to save five lives and in Pond it was to wade 
into a pond to save the life of a child and thereby damage one’s clothing and make one late 
for work.  In these two scenarios, then, saving lives required incurring relatively minor 
personal economic costs or inconvenience.  
Confidence in and ease of action decision: As well as indicating how likely they 
thought it was that they would take the apparently utility-maximising action, participants 
were asked how sure they were that their initial answer was “an accurate prediction of how 
[they] would act if [they] were actually in the situation described” (Extremely unsure [1] to 
Extremely sure [6]) and how easy it was to make that decision (Extremely easy [1] to 
Extremely difficulty [6]). 
Reasons for decisions: Participants were then asked how much they agreed or 
disagreed (1 = Disagree very strongly, 7 = Agree very strongly) that their decision about 
whether or not to act was influenced by each of the following factors: “The likely 
consequences for [the most obvious beneficiaries of action, e.g. in Torture] the five children”; 
“The likely consequences for [the most obvious beneficiary of inaction, e.g. in Torture] the 
single child”; “The likely consequences for myself”; “The nature of the action, i.e. [e.g. in 
Torture] kidnapping and torturing a child”; “My feelings”; “The relationship between myself 
and one or more people who would be affected by my decision”; “The sort of person I 
consider myself to be or that I would like to be”; “Wanting to do 'the right thing'”; and “Not 
wanting to do 'the wrong thing'”.  
For convenience, “consequences for the most obvious beneficiaries of action” will be 
referred to below as “utilitarian consequences”, “consequences for the most obvious 
beneficiaries of inaction” will be referred to as “partiality”, and “The sort of person I consider 
myself to be or that I would like to be” will be referred to as “identity”.  
Both across and within scenarios, Principal Axis Factor analyses with Promax rotation 
suggested that these nine questions about reasons should be treated as distinct single-item 
measures: scree plots usually had no clear inflection point, cumulative percentages of 
variance explained by extractable factors tended to be low, and items loaded onto different 
factors across scenarios (Russell, 2002).  
Section 2 of the questionnaire asked participants to make judgments about other 
people on the basis of their alleged actions within hypothetical scenarios. Analysis of data 
from this section will be reported elsewhere. 
The final section of the questionnaire asked a number of demographic questions, gave 
an open-response option to “tell us anything you want to about your experience of completing 
this questionnaire”, and thanked participants for their efforts.  
3. Results 
Action decisions. Figure 1 shows the numbers of participants in each condition 
choosing each possible answer to the question of how likely they were to engage in the 
apparently utility-maximising act. Almost everyone (98.1%) thought it at least “very likely” 
that they would save the child in Pond but the majority of participants thought it at most 
“slightly likely” that they would send money in Appeal (73.5%), push the man off the Bridge 
(88.4%), warn the strangers in Fire (68.7%), or kidnap and murder a child in Torture 
(90.9%). Although the majority of participants reported that it was at least “quite likely” that 
they would act in Switch (74.2%), action decisions appeared to be much more evenly 
distributed in this scenario than in the others.  
 
  
Figure 1: Number of participants in each condition selecting each possible likelihood 
of engaging in the apparently utility-maximizing action. 
 
 
Table 1 shows that participants reported having least difficulty making their decisions 
in Pond and most difficulty in Fire and Switch. Participants’ reported confidence that they 
would act as they had indicated was correspondingly lowest in Fire and Switch and highest in 
Pond.  
 
 Table 1: Mean (and standard deviation) ratings for difficulty of and confidence in 
action decisions across scenarios. 
 Difficulty Confidence 
Appeal 2.66
b (1.13) 4.67b (1.11) 
Bridge 2.98b (1.55) 4.44b (1.36) 
Fire 3.43a (1.32) 4.02c (1.28) 
Pond 1.60c (1.03) 5.43a (0.85) 
Switch 3.59a (1.37) 3.69c (1.31) 
Torture 2.72b (1.72) 4.50b (1.50) 
Note: Means within columns without a common superscript letter differ significantly using Sidak post hoc 
comparisons. Because this paper is exploratory rather than hypothesis testing, no corrections are made anywhere 
for multiple comparisons, meaning that statistically significant results should be interpreted with caution.  
 
 
 
Reasons for decisions: Prior to examining differences in reasons for decisions within 
and across scenarios, a 6 (scenarios, between-subjects) x 9 (reasons, within-subjects) 
ANOVA confirmed a significant multivariate effect for reasons (F (7.05, 7428.14) = 75.56, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .07) and a significant multivariate interaction (F(35.27, 7428.14) = 59.53, p < 
.001, ηp2 = 0.22). A series of oneway ANOVAs with Sidak post hoc comparisons were used 
to explore these effects. 
Reasons across scenarios: As shown in the penultimate column of Table 2, averaged 
across scenarios, participants reported being influenced in their hypothetical decision-making 
mostly by their feelings, followed by wanting to do the right thing, identity, partiality, 
utilitarian consequences, not wanting to do the wrong thing, the nature of the action, 
relationships, and consequences for the self.  
The final column of Table 2 shows that each reason was indicated as being 
significantly more influential upon decision-making in some scenarios than in others. 
Specifically comparing the two focal scenarios, consideration of utilitarian consequences was 
the only reason reported to be more influential on decision-making in Switch than in Bridge, 
t(337.97) = 8.38, p < .001. Reasons reported as more important for decision-making in Bridge 
than in Switch were nature of the action (t(338) = 7.48, p < .001), identity (t(338) = 4.85, p < 
.001), personal feelings (t(338) = 2.95, p < .01), partiality (t(338) = 2.79, p < .01), and 
consequences for the self (t(338) = 2.75, p < .01).  
 
Table 2: Reported disagreement or agreement that hypothetical decisions were 
affected by various reasons. 
 Appeal Bridge Fire Pond Switch Torture M F 
Reported 
reason 
n=166 n=181 n=182 n=206 n=159 n=165 n=1059 
 
 
Utilitarian 
consequences 
 
3.67c,d 
(2.01) 
 
3.88c 
(1.90) 
 
4.04c,d 
(1.96) 
 
6.74a 
(.66) 
 
5.50a 
(1.65) 
 
3.76f 
(1.76) 
 
4.66c 
(2.07) 
102.21 
 
Partiality 
 
4.73a 
(1.97) 
 
5.63a 
(1.45) 
 
6.29a 
(1.19) 
 
2.10g 
(1.48) 
 
5.15a,b 
(1.64) 
 
5.55b,c 
(1.60) 
 
4.83b 
(2.11) 
177.40 
 
Consequences 
for self 
 
3.71b,c,d 
(1.77) 
 
4.63b 
(2.02) 
 
3.51d 
(1.96) 
 
2.91f 
(1.80) 
 
4.04d 
(1.89) 
 
4.64d,e 
2.00 
 
3.87e 
(2.00) 
23.52 
 
Nature of the 
action 
 
4.11a,b,c 
(1.90) 
 
5.50a 
(1.78) 
 
3.64d 
(1.66) 
 
3.58e 
(2.06) 
 
3.96d 
(2.00) 
 
6.32a 
(1.33) 
 
4.48c,d 
(2.08) 
67.52 
 
My feelings 
 
4.31a,b 
(1.86) 
 
5.54a 
(1.54) 
 
5.64b 
(1.41) 
 
5.54b,c 
(1.59) 
 
5.02a,b 
(1.59) 
 
5.75b 
(1.56) 
 
5.32a 
(1.66) 
19.88 
 
Relationship 
between self 
and other(s) 
 
3.33d 
(1.72) 
 
4.39b,c 
(1.84) 
 
5.57b 
(1.54) 
 
3.85e 
(2.00) 
 
4.48c,d 
(1.85) 
 
4.25e,f 
(1.91) 
 
4.31d 
(1.94) 
30.11 
 
Identity 
 
3.97b,c 
(1.78) 
 
5.49a 
(1.34) 
 
4.32c 
(1.71) 
 
5.42c 
(1.65) 
 
4.73b,c 
(1.52) 
 
5.67b 
(1.58) 
 
4.95b 
(1.72) 
32.87 
 
Wanting to do 
the right thing 
 
4.08a,b,c 
(1.85) 
 
5.22a 
(1.40) 
 
4.08c,d 
(1.89) 
 
5.83b 
(1.36) 
 
5.34a 
(1.56) 
 
5.55b 
(1.45) 
 
5.03b 
(1.74) 
40.25 
 
Not wanting to 
do the wrong 
thing 
 
3.43d 
(1.75) 
 
5.38a 
(1.47) 
 
3.97c,d 
(1.87) 
 
4.44d 
(2.03) 
 
5.16a,b 
(1.69) 
 
5.08c,d 
(1.77) 
 
4.57c 
(1.91) 
31.84 
 
F 
 
12.46 
  
28.88  
 
77.56 
 
203.04 
 
19.93 
 
45.25 
 
77.45 
 
Note: All F values significant at p < .001. Means within columns without a common superscript letter differ 
significantly using Sidak post hoc comparisons.  
  
Particularly noteworthy among the other across-scenario results was that 
consideration of utilitarian consequences was reported as being a reason for decision-making 
to an even greater extent in Pond than in Switch (t(197.03) = 8.87, p < .001) and that 
partiality (i.e. consideration of decisions’ consequence for the most obvious beneficiaries of 
inaction) was reported as being much less important for decision-making in Pond than in 
either Bridge (t(385) = -23.79, p < .001) or Switch (t(363) = -18.89, p < .001). 
Reasons within scenarios. The bottom row of Table 2 shows F values from a series of 
within-subject ANOVAs which examined the reported influence of each reason upon action-
decisions within scenarios. 
In Appeal, participants agreed that hypothetical action decisions were influenced, in 
descending order, by partiality, their feelings, the nature of the action, wanting to do the right 
thing, identity, consequences for the self, utilitarian consequences, not wanting to do the 
wrong thing, and relationships.  
In Bridge, participants agreed that hypothetical action decisions were influenced, in 
descending order, by partiality, their feelings, the nature of the action, identity, not wanting to 
do the wrong thing, wanting to do the right thing, consequences for the self, relationships, 
and utilitarian consequences.  
In Fire, participants agreed that hypothetical action decisions were influenced, in 
descending order, by partiality, their feelings, relationships, identity, wanting to do the right 
thing, utilitarian consequences, not wanting to do the wrong thing, the nature of the action, 
and consequences for the self.  
In Pond, participants agreed that hypothetical action decisions were influenced, in 
descending order, by utilitarian consequences, wanting to do the right thing, their feelings, 
identity, not wanting to do the wrong thing, relationships, the nature of the action, 
consequences for the self, and partiality.  
In Switch, participants agreed that hypothetical action decisions were influenced, in 
descending order, by utilitarian consequences, wanting to do the right thing, not wanting to 
do the wrong thing, partiality, their feelings, identity, relationships, consequences for the self, 
and the nature of the action.  
In Torture, participants agreed that hypothetical action decisions were influenced, in 
descending order, by the nature of the action, their feelings, identity, wanting to do the right 
thing, their partiality, not wanting to do the wrong thing, consequences for the self, 
relationships, and utilitarian consequences.  
For current purposes, the most important of these findings are probably that (a) 
whereas utilitarianism was clearly the dominant concern affecting reported decision-making 
in Pond, multiple other concerns were reported as being as important as utilitarianism in 
Switch and as more important than utilitarianism for decision-making in Bridge, (b) in Switch 
utilitarian consequences were reported as being more important and partiality was reported as 
being less important than was the case in Bridge, and (c) in Bridge (as well as in Torture), 
utilitarian consequences was reported as the concern least influential on decision-making. 
In all but one of the scenarios, small numbers of participants choosing either action or 
inaction made separate exploration of their reasons inappropriate and uninformative. 
However, because participants’ decisions were uniquely broadly distributed in Switch, it was 
possible to compare the reported influence upon decision-making for participants who 
indicated being no more than “quite likely” to act with participants who indicated that it was 
at least “likely” that they would act. As shown in Table 3, almost every reason was reported 
as being approximately equally influential upon decision-making for those participants who 
reported being relatively unlikely to act. For participants who reported being relatively likely 
to act in this scenario, however, utilitarian concerns appeared most influential. Independent t-
tests also suggested that utilitarian concerns and wanting to do the right thing were 
significantly more influential upon decision-making for those who reported being relatively 
likely to act, while concerns about consequences for the self were more influential upon the 
decisions of participants who reported being relatively unlikely to act.  
 
Table 3: Switch dilemma: reported reasons for decisions by those more and less likely 
to act. 
 Not act Act      t 
Reported reason n=71 n=88  
 
Utilitarian consequences 
 
4.59a,b 
 
6.24a 
 
-6.75*** 
 
Partiality 
 
4.89a,b 
 
5.39b,c 
 
-1.93 
 
Consequences for self 
 
4.79a,b 
 
3.44f 
 
  4.76*** 
 
Nature of the action 
 
4.20b 
 
3.78e,f 
 
  1.30 
 
My feelings 
 
5.25a 
 
4.86c,d 
 
  1.56 
 
Relationship between self and other(s) 
 
4.77a,b 
 
4.25d,e 
 
  1.79 
 
Identity 
 
4.70a,b 
 
4.76c.d 
 
-0.24 
 
Wanting to do the right thing 
 
4.92a,b 
 
5.68b 
 
-3.08** 
 
Not wanting to do the wrong thing 
 
5.18a 
 
5.15b,c 
 
  0.13 
 
F 
 
2.34* 
 
24.61*** 
 
Note: Means within columns without a common superscript letter differ significantly using 
Sidak posthoc comparisons. * = p < .05. ** = p < .01. *** = p < .001. 
  
 Predicting decisions from considered reasons: Having checked for a lack of 
substantial collinearity (all tolerance values > .48; all VIF values < 2.1; see Field, 2013), 
logistic regression analysis was used to predict whether participants were “actors” or 
“bystanders” according to whether or not they reported being at least “quite likely” to engage 
in the apparently utility-maximising action. The null model, predicting that everyone was a 
bystander, made accurate predictions 56.7% of the time. In combination, using the 9 reasons 
as predictors increased accurate prediction to 87.0%, correctly predicting 88.7% of 
bystanders and 84.7% of actors (Nagelkerke R2 = .721, χ2(9) = 816.488, p < .001).  
 
Table 4: Logistic regression predicting reported likelihood of engaging in apparently 
utility-maximising action, averaged across scenarios. 
 B SE Wald Exp(B) p  
Reported reason      
Utilitarian consequences 1.26 .09 190.72 3.52 .000 
Partiality -0.56 .07 59.02 0.57 .000 
Consequences for self -0.07 .06 1.33 0.93 .250 
Nature of the action -0.26 .06 16.63 0.77 .000 
My feelings -0.04 .08 0.30 0.96 .586 
Relationship between self and other(s) 0.05 .06 0.65 1.05 .420 
Identity -0.11 .09 1.65 0.90 .200 
Wanting to do the right thing 0.50 .10 25.68 1.65 .000 
Not wanting to do the wrong thing -0.16 .08 4.69 0.85 .030 
 
 
Table 4 shows that, averaged across the scenarios, 5 reported reasons made 
independent contributions to explaining whether participants were actors or bystanders. The 
most influential predictor was utilitarian consequences, a reported reason which made action 
more likely. Wanting to do the right thing also made action more likely. Bystanding was 
made more likely by the nature of the action, partiality, and not wanting to do the wrong 
thing.  
 
Table 5: Exp(B) from logistic regressions within each scenario predicting reported 
likelihood of engaging in actions apparently maximising utility. 
 Appeal Bridge Fire Pond Switch Torture 
Reported reason       
Utilitarian 
consequences 
2.40*** 2.70** 3.61*** 1.56 9.69*** 2.64** 
Partiality 0.71 0.63 0.51* 0.65 0.25** 0.71 
Consequences for 
self 
1.38 0.78 0.86 0.75 0.98 0.83 
Nature of the action 0.93 0.67* 1.83** 0.68 0.89 0.55* 
My feelings 1.03 1.23 0.64* 1.23 1.12 0.91 
Relationship 
between self and 
other(s) 
0.93 1.19 0.98 1.02 0.72 1.17 
Identity 1.54* 0.56* 1.01 2.10 0.71 1.04 
Wanting to do the 
right thing 
1.99** 2.03 1.33 1.59 2.26** 1.53 
Not wanting to do 
the wrong thing 
0.82 0.53* 0.81 0.49 0.63 0.96 
Null prediction 73.5% 
bystand 
88.4% 
bystand 
68.7% 
bystand 
98.1% 
act 
74.4% 
act 
90.9% 
bystand 
χ2(9) 96.289*** 60.489*** 124.980*** 16.879 94.650*** 35.918*** 
Nagelkerke R2 .642 .555 .698 .451 .657 .429 
Model prediction  
(bystand/act) 
84.9% 
(90/71) 
92.3% 
(98/48) 
89.0% 
(92/83) 
98.1% 
(25/100) 
90.0% 
(73/96) 
93.9% 
(99/40) 
Note: Bold figures indicate significant predictors. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 
 
 
Table 5 shows the odds ratios associated with each reason within each scenario. In 
line with the results just reported, utilitarian consequences was a significant predictor of 
acting in 5 of the 6 scenarios. The exception was Pond, where no reasons were significant 
predictors (although it should be recognised that there was essentially no variation in the 
dependent measure in Pond). Beyond this, the striking thing about Table 5 is the lack of a 
coherent pattern of predictors of anticipated action or bystanding. Different combinations of 
reasons were significant predictors across scenarios. Also, reported reasons to engage in 
“utilitarian” acts in some situations were given as reasons not to do so in others, e.g. identity 
concerns in Appeal and Bridge, respectively. 
4. Discussion 
Arising from concerns about the validity of measures of “utilitarianism” and “non-
utilitarianism” in classic hypothetical dilemmas typified by Bridge and Switch, we asked 
participants to report the extent to which their decisions were influenced by a variety of 
factors within these and other scenarios. Most participants reported being at least “quite 
likely” to pull the lever in Switch but “not at all likely” to push the fat man in Bridge, thus 
broadly replicating the standard findings obtained with these scenarios. 
Participants were able to express reasons for their decisions in decision-coherent 
ways. Over 85% of participants’ choices could be accurately predicted from only five of the 
measures of potential influences upon decision-making that were examined: utilitarian 
concerns, wanting to do the right thing, not wanting to do the wrong thing, partiality, and the 
nature of the action.  
Utilitarian concern was the most important determinant of “utilitarian” choices, i.e. 
ones which maximised utilitarian outcomes. Such concern was the strongest predictor of 
action across scenarios and also in each individual scenario other than Pond (which had 
almost no variance). It also dominated participants’ reported reasons for action in the two 
scenarios in which such action was common, i.e. Pond and Switch. To that extent, then, it 
seems appropriate to say both that utilitarian concerns seemed to motivate “utilitarian” 
choices and that “utilitarian” choices seemed to result primarily from utilitarian concerns. 
Nevertheless, it seems also true both that utilitarian concern did not always result in 
“utilitarian” choice and that “utilitarian” actions were not motivated solely by utilitarian 
concerns. Utilitarian concerns were among the most prominent concerns of bystanders in 
Switch, for example, and prediction of action was improved in each scenario (other than in 
Pond) when concerns other than simply utilitarian ones were taken into account. Thus, while 
utilitarian concerns seemed to motivate “utilitarian” choices and “utilitarian” choices seemed 
to be motivated largely by utilitarian concerns, it would seem prudent to clearly differentiate 
“utilitarian” choices (i.e. ones which maximise utilitarian outcomes) and utilitarian concern 
(i.e. which may or may not result in “utilitarian” choices).  
“deontological” choices – i.e. those consistent with moral rules – appeared to result 
from shifting mixes of concerns (cf. Moore, Clark & Kane, 2008; Nichols & Mallon, 2006; 
Spino & Cummins, 2014). In Switch, for example, all of the concerns measured (including 
utilitarian concern) were reported by bystanders to be similarly influential upon their 
decision-making whereas in Torture the nature of the action required to promote utilitarian 
outcomes was a particularly potent determinant of bystanding. Thus, to the extent that having 
concerns which silence or overpower utilitarian ones results in bystanding and that such 
bystanding results when utilitarian concerns do not dominate, there is some justification for 
calling such actions “non-utilitarian” (cf. Laakasuo & Sundval, 2016). However, the fact that 
utilitarianism was sometimes among the concerns of bystanders suggests that the label “non-
utilitarian” may not be ideal to describe people not selecting the “utilitarian” choice (Białek, 
& De Neys, 2016; Wheeler & Laham, 2016).   
The combination of people seeming to have an impressive ability to articulate their 
reasoning and decisions being influenced by shifting mixes of reasons across situations raises 
exciting possibilities for future research. Studies of moral decision-making using genuinely 
open-ended methods (cf. Goodwin & Landy, 2014, Study 4) could help to identify which 
moral and non-moral rules people aspire to conform to (Graham et al., 2013), what forms of 
utilitarianism people are most influenced by (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015), how multiple 
reasons interact to influence people’s moral decisions (Haidt, 2003), the extent to which 
reasons apply consistently across situations (Dancy, 2013), and whether resolution of genuine 
dilemmas is followed by a sense of accomplishment or of guilt (De Wijze, 2005). 
Past research has suggested considerable limits on people’s abilities to articulate 
principles guiding their behaviours (Haidt, 2001). Nevertheless, participants in this study 
were able to identify the reasons for their actions with such specificity that most of their 
choices could be predicted from those self-reported reasons. Given the utility of being able to 
simply ask participants why they do what they do, it would be very beneficial if future 
research could more systematically investigate how much insight people have into their own 
motivation and how such insight varies across situations. One possibility is that people are 
sometimes able to recognise relatively ‘obvious’ factors affecting their decision-making, even 
if they are less able to recognise the operation of quite complex philosophical distinctions 
such as doctrines of double effect and unintended consequences (Cushman et al., 2006; 
Mikhail, 2002).  
A striking result from this study is the combination of participants reporting that their 
feelings were a very important influence upon their decision-making and those self-reported 
feelings playing such a small role in predicting participants’ choices. These findings would 
not be contradictory if feelings accompanied almost all of the decisions that participants 
made. That is, rather than decisions being influenced by deliberation or by feelings (Greene 
et al., 2001), feelings may in some circumstances influence decisions whether or not 
deliberation occurs. Alternatively, participants in this study may have been reporting as 
“feelings” affect that they anticipated if they made one or other decision, i.e. counter-factual 
cognitions about anticipated feelings. These and related possibilities are likely to be among 
the many issues addressed by the already-thriving research activity investigating the 
relationship between affect (broadly conceived) and moral motivation (Teper, Zhong, & 
Inzlicht, 2015).   
This study suggests that responses in classic hypothetical dilemmas have some – but 
also somewhat limited – validity as indicators of people being influenced by “utilitarian-
relative-to-non-utilitarian” concerns. This is mainly because both possible decisions in such 
scenarios can be affected by numbers of concerns, because the influence of particular 
concerns differs across situations depending in part upon what other concerns are present, and 
because particular concerns can be present even when they are not decisive in affecting which 
decisions are made and which actions are taken. More positively, this study also suggests 
both that people may be much more able to report the reasons for their decision-making than 
has often been thought and that moral actors’ decisions may be substantially affected by a 
relatively limited list of concerns.  
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Appendix 
Appeal 
Browsing on the internet one day, you chance upon an appeal spearheaded by an 
internationally renowned academic and supported by an impressive array of people with 
experience and expertise in multiple relevant areas. The appeal presents compelling evidence 
that a £100 donation from you would probably be enough to prevent five children in the 
'developing world' dying from an easily curable condition. It also convincingly demonstrates 
that, no matter how poor you may be relative to some, by living in the 'developed world', you 
are considerably richer than most people on the planet. You are then invited to make a £100 
donation. It's up to you. What do you do? 
Bridge  
One day while walking, you see an out-of-control train hurtling through a deep, 
narrow valley with steep walls on both sides of the track. You see that if the train continues 
unchecked on its present course, it will round a bend and run over and kill 5 workmen 
working on the tracks. The workmen do not know the train is coming and would not be able 
to escape even if they did know. You are standing on a bridge and a man much bigger and 
heavier than you is leaning precariously far over the railing, watching the oncoming train. 
You know that with even a gentle push, the man will fall on the track and be bulky enough to 
stop the train before it gets to the five workman, but of course he will die. No one else is 
around. It's up to you. What do you do? 
Fire  
One day you are visiting an exhibition with the person you love most in the world. 
While temporarily separated, you become aware that a fire has started and is spreading 
rapidly. Five people are in a room you have just left, where loud music is playing. If someone 
does not alert them of the risk immediately, they will almost certainly die in the fire. You are 
the only person who could warn them of the danger but to do so you would have to rush back 
down the corridor, open the door, and shout over the music. If you do this, you will not have 
time to rush down the corridor in the opposite direction to warn the person you came with 
about the fire. Without receiving the warning from you, that person will almost certainly 
perish in the fire. It's up to you. What do you do? 
Pond  
You pass a pond on the way to work. On hot days, children sometimes play in the 
pond, which is only about knee-deep. The weather's cool today, though, and the hour is early, 
so you are surprised to see a child splashing about in the pond. As you get closer, you see that 
it is a very young child, just a toddler, who is flailing about, unable to stay upright or walk 
out of the pond. You look for the parents or babysitter, but there is no one else around. The 
child is unable to keep his head above the water for more than a few seconds at a time. If you 
don't wade in and pull him out, he seems likely to drown. Wading in is easy and safe, but 
your new shoes will be ruined and your outfit will get wet and muddy. By the time you hand 
the child over to someone responsible for him, and change into clean clothes, you will be late 
for work. It's up to you. What do you do? 
Switch  
One day while walking, you see an out-of-control train hurtling through a deep, 
narrow valley with steep walls on both sides of the track. You see that if the train continues 
unchecked on its present course, it will round a bend and run over and kill 5 workmen 
working on the tracks. The workmen do not know the train is coming and would not be able 
to escape even if they did know. You are standing by a lever and you know that if you pull it, 
the train will be diverted onto a side-track where it will instead run over and kill a single 
workman who also would not be able to escape. No one else is around. It's up to you. What 
do you do? 
Torture  
You are contacted by a terrorist organisation. They demand that you kidnap a child 
from the street and then torture it to death over a period of several hours. Unless you send 
documentary proof within 24 hours that this has been done, the terrorists promise that they 
will themselves kidnap and torture to death five children. If you tell anyone about this 
arrangement before the 24 hours is up, the terrorists promise that they will kidnap and torture 
to death a great many more children. Recent history leaves no room for doubt: these threats 
are real. It's up to you. What do you do? 
 
